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Traditional labor supply studies primarily deal with the incentive effects of changes in after-
tax wages. Studying only the effects on contracted hours could however be misleading. To get 
a more complete picture of the determinants of actual hours worked, absenteeism needs to be 
taken into account. In fact, work absenteeism may be seen as a dual to labor supply problems 
(Johansson and Brännäs, 1998). In particular, it seems justified to study the incentive effects 
of different compensation levels for absenteeism on actual hours worked. 
 
Naturally, absence from work can have multiple causes, but there is little doubt that the 
quantitatively most important one is sick leave.1 However, there are relatively few studies of 
these issues. For example, according to the subject index, the terms “sick leave” and 
“absenteeism” do not appear at all in the 3,630 pages of the Handbook of Labor Economics.2  
 
The quantitative effects of sick leave can be considerable. In Sweden in 1988, the average 
sick leave per person employed totaled five work weeks per year, i.e., more than 10 percent of 
total contracted working time. A few years later, this had fallen to three weeks, corresponding 
to an increase in hours actually worked by close to five percent. If such a large increase in 
effective labor supply should be achieved by a wage increase, this would, given typical 
estimates of Swedish labor supply elasticities3 of 0.1, require an after-tax wage hike on the 
order of 40–50 percent. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the insurance system for sick leave 
compensation affects sick leave behavior. Earlier studies in this small literature (Barmby, 
Orme and Treble, 1991, 1995; Drago and Wooden, 1992; Johansson and Palme, 1996, 2002; 
Johansson and Brännäs, 1998; Broström, Johansson and Palme, 2001; Gilleskie, 1998) use 
individual cross-section data. The typical setup is to analyze how absenteeism differs across 
individuals with respect to individual characteristics (age, gender, marital status, part-time 
work, income et cetera). Economic incentives are captured by the after-tax wage rate, or the 
difference (or ratio) between the wage rate and the sick-leave compensation. It is notable, 
                                                 
1 Johansson and Palme (1996, p. 196) define work absence as “time when the employee is absent from work, 
which cannot be referred to as statutory leisure time or absence agreed upon in advance with the employer.” 
They refer to a study showing that 97.1 percent of work absence for blue collar workers in Sweden is covered by 
the sickness insurance. 
2 Vol. 1–3C (1986, 1999), Amsterdam: North-Holland.   3
however, that the typical study only analyzes one insurance system at a single point in time. 
The necessary variation in economic incentives is obtained since individuals differ with 
respect to marginal tax rates, compensation levels, or other aspects of the insurance scheme. 
 
In contrast, we examine long-run time-series of aggregate sick leave behavior in Sweden 
during the period 1955–99. The variation in economic incentives is obtained by the frequent 
changes in the insurance system over time. The long time series and the fact that there has 
been considerable variation in the rules for sick leave compensation during the period makes 
the Swedish experience particularly useful as a case for testing for the existence of economic 
incentive effects on sick leave behavior. 
 
The cross-section micro approach has several advantages. For example, provided the sample 
is large, one can obtain fairly precise estimates of preferences, and thereby fairly reliable 
forecasts of responses to future changes in the insurance system. There are, however, some 
drawbacks. First, if reliable estimates of preferences are to be obtained, the statutory benefit 
rules must give an accurate representation of the individual’s decision problem. In reality, it is 
not the statutory rules themselves, but the agent’s perception of the rules that is relevant. But 
even if the perception is correct, some of the changes in the system do not apply to the broad 
compensation rates in Table 1, but are more subtle and consist of, e.g., changes in the 
detection probabilities for those who shirk, or changes in some regions of the budget sets that 
cannot easily be represented by a few parameters only (cf. footnote 6). 
 
Second, there are interesting time-series issues involved that cannot be properly analyzed by 
looking at a cross-section of individuals immediately before and after a reform. Some of these 
issues are related to the difficulty mentioned above of representing the actual decisions 
problem (for instance, the individuals may not perceive the true changes in the budget sets 
immediately, but will learn about the new rules over time). At the same time, time-series 
studies may raise issues of causality and spurious correlation that need to be dealt with. We 
will return to these issues when discussing our specification of the model, and only note that 
the understanding of sick-leave behavior is well served by microeconometric cross-section 
studies as well as by studies of aggregate time series.  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
3 See Aronsson and Walker (1997) for a survey of Swedish studies.   4
The paper is organized as follows. In section II we present the data describing the evolution of 
aggregate sick leave behavior in Sweden from 1955 to 1999 and discuss some limitations in 
the data. Section III contains a brief characterization of the numerous sick leave compensation 
schemes during this period. In section IV we discuss problems of causality and present a 
number of regression analyses using annual data. The regression analyses are taken one step 
further in section V, where we use a panel of quarterly data to identify possible effects of the 
1987 and 1991 reforms. Section VI concludes the paper. 
 
The main finding of our paper is that there appears, in most cases, to be strong effects on sick 
leave behavior from changes in sick leave compensation levels. Such an effect can be detected 
both when the system is rendered more generous and when it becomes more restrictive. 




II.  A First Glance at the Data 
 
In Sweden there is a large amount of data on sick leave, covering long time periods and 
widely different insurance systems. The main database is compiled by the National Social 
Insurance Board (RFV) and gives the average number of sick days per person and year, in a 
time series from 1955. This series is depicted in Figure 1, where we see that in 1955 paid sick 
leave averaged 12 days a year. This figure reached a peak in 1988 at 25 days per year, fell 
sharply during the early 1990s and is now increasing again. 
 
There seems to be a slight upward trend in the data. A simple time-trend regression indicates 
that the number of sick-leave days increases by 0.08 days per annum over the period, but the 
trend is barely significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
The RFV data, however, only include sick leave covered by the Swedish national sickness 
benefit system. From 1955 to 1962, the first two days of a sickness spell were not covered, 
and from 1962 to 1974 the first day was not covered. These days are thus not included in the 
data, which means that the diagram slightly underestimates the number of days during the 
earlier part of the time span. Neither was the first day paid for from 1974 to 1987, but it was 
possible to circumvent this restriction by reporting sick (to an answering service) before   5
midnight the preceding day. Due to lack of data, it is impossible to assess the importance of 












From December 1987 to December 1991, the national insurance system covered all sickness 
spells, however short; thus the data in Figure 1 provide full coverage for those years. In the 
1990s, various changes in the system were implemented, withdrawn, and re-implemented. 
The basic feature of the different systems used in the 1990s was that the national system did 
not cover the first few weeks of a sickness spell. Instead, the initial sickness period was 
financed by the employers to varying degrees, the idea being to create incentives for the 
employers to monitor their employees, to improve working conditions, et cetera. All these 
changes and experiments in the 1990s mean that short-term sickness spells are not included in 
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Thanks to other data sources, however, it is possible to correct for this. The Swedish 
Employers’ Confederation (SAF) has compiled a database consisting of a reasonably 
representative sample covering 2,500 establishments and 220,000 employees in the private 
sector. In this data set absenteeism due to sickness can be categorized by the length of the 
sickness spell, and one can identify how many spells that were shorter than a given number of 
days.4 Thus, the numbers missing for the short-term spells in the RFV database can be easily 
obtained. Assuming that the sickness pattern is the same for the public sector as for the private 
sector, we have thus corrected the data in Figure 1. The exact procedure used for this 
correction is described in the Appendix. The corrected time series is shown in Figure 2, where 





FIG. 2. – Days of paid sick leave according to the RFV and SAF databases combined, 1955–
99. 
Note: See Appendix for the construction of this series. 
 
  
Here one can see a significant upward trend, indicating that the number of sick days increases 
by 0.18 days per annum. Due to the missing data for short-term spells at the beginning of the 
                                                 
4 The data are published in SAF (2000). The published data are arranged into rather broad groups of spell 
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period, one should not make too much of that trend, however.5 Still, this is the best data 
available for long time series. But before we proceed to the more reliable, shorter data series, 
we will take a look at the sickness benefit insurance in a long-term perspective. 
 
 
  III.  The Sickness Benefit Rules – A Brief Characterization 
 
A mandatory, government-financed sickness insurance system was introduced in 1955. Over 
the years, this system has been reformed a great number of times. Table 1 summarizes the 
changes in the compensation levels (replacement rates) from 1987 up to 2000. 
 
Prior to 1987, the system was too complicated to be summarized by a few numbers, like the 
ones in Table 1. For instance, before 1974 compensation was untaxed, which makes a 
comparison with later periods difficult. Also, compensation could vary depending on the day 
of the week or whether the insured person was married, had children etc.6 The important pre-
1987 changes are the following. 
 
Before 1987 there was an initial waiting period; during the first day(s) of a sick spell 
compensation was zero. Between 1955 and 1966 this waiting period was three days, and in 
1967 it was reduced to one day. In 1987 the waiting period was removed, and compensation 
was paid from the first day of a sickness period.7 
 
Although the level of compensation thus varied across individuals and weekdays, the overall 
level was substantially raised on three occasions: in 1967, 1967 and 1974. In December 1987 
the level was made uniform, and raised to 90 percent for everybody. 
 
In addition to the public system, supplementary benefit systems developed as a result of 
negotiations between employers and trade unions. These systems were introduced gradually 
                                                 
5 According to the SAF database, roughly 10 percent of all workdays lost in the 1990s were due to one-day 
sickness spells. If the pattern was the same in the 1950s and 1960s, the curve in Figure 2 underestimates the true 
absenteeism for these decades by around 1.5 days. Adding 1.5 days to each year’s figure for the period 1955-
1973 and fitting a trend line to the thus adjusted time series of the whole time period still yields a significant 
upward slope: the number of sick days increases by 0.13 days per annum (standard error = 0.032). 
6 Cf. Broberg (1973). 
7 In 1974–1987 it was possible to avoid the waiting period by reporting sick before midnight the preceding day 
(even if that day was a Sunday).   8
for different professions and industries; by the mid-1970s they had become fairly uniform and 
covered virtually all employees. 
 
In Table 1, the additional percentage of the wage covered by these systems are indicated to 
the right of the “+” sign. For example, the entry “90 + 10” for the first day of absence during 
the December 1987 to February 1991 period means that from the first day of absence, the 
person received 90 percent of his or her regular wage from the public system and an 
additional 10 percent from the supplementary employer/union system.  
 
Thus, there has been considerable variation in the sick leave compensation system since its 
inception some 45 years ago.8 This institutional variation is a great advantage in our context, 
since it increases the possibilities for identifying any behavioral effects of the system.  
 




                                                 
8 Table 1 only gives the changes in the compensation levels. There have also been other changes, for example in 
the administrative rigor and the requirement of a certificate from a doctor as soon as the leave of absence 
exceeds a certain time span. For example, in October 1995 a number of measures were taken that tightened the 
qualification criteria for receiving long-term sickness benefits. Although these changes are difficult to quantify, 
we have tried to take some of them into account in our regressions reported below. Table 1   

































2–3  90 + 10  65 + 10 0 + 75 0 + 75 0 + 75 0 + 75  0 + 75 0 + 80 0 + 80
4–14  90 + 10  80 + 10 0 + 90 0 + 90 0 + 90 0 + 75  0 + 75 0 + 80 0 + 80
15–28  90 + 10  80 + 10 80 + 10 80 + 10 80 + 10 75 + 10  0 + 75 0 + 80 80 + 10
29–90  90 + 10  80 + 10 80 + 10 80 + 10 80 + 10 75 + 10  75 + 10 80 + 10 80 + 10
91–365  90 + 5  90 90 80 80 75  75 80 80
366–  90 + 5  90 90 80 70 75  75 80 80
 
Note: 
1Refers to calendar days and not to working days. 
2The waiting period can be partly avoided after 1993 by reporting sick late in the day. The wage deduction will then 
be limited to a small part of the day (as little as ¼) when the sickness began.  
The percentage to the right of the +-sign, when applicable, indicates the replacement rate emanating from supplementary schemes. Throughout the entire period the coverage 
of the public system has been capped, i.e., no coverage is provided above a certain income level (more than 90 percent of the wage-earners have consistently been below this 
level). In most cases, however, employers provide supplementary coverage for higher incomes. 
A physician’s certificate is always required in order to continue to receive benefits after the seventh calendar day of sickness. Generally, any physician of the patient’s choice 
may issue the required certificate. The criteria became more stringent in October 1995 including a requirement for more thorough medical examinations for long-term cases. 
Source: Lidwall and Skogman Thoursie (2000) and SAF (2000).   
IV.  Empirical Analysis 
 
A.  General Formulation 
 
The propensity to report sick can be affected by a number of variables. In order to see how the 
compensation level in the insurance system affects absenteeism, we have to control for, inter 
alia, the general health situation in the country, the age composition of the labor force, and the 
situation in the labor market.  
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0  (1) 
 
Here,  t S  is the average number of sick days per person in year t, using the corrected data of 
Figure 2. This model allows for flexibility in the dynamic structure since lagged values of S 
are included as explanatory variables. Moreover, it makes it possible to distinguish between 
the short-run impact effect and the long-run effect of the introduction of different reforms.   
 
The explanatory variable  t X  is a vector of variables that may affect absenteeism. These 
include 
•  The rate of unemployment; traditionally, the tightness of the labor market seems to have 
an impact on absenteeism (e.g., Leigh, 1985 and Arai and Skogman Thoursie, 2001). 
•  The general health condition in the population (measured by the mortality rate in the total 
population).  
•  The age composition of the population (measured by the fraction of the labor force aged 
45–64). 
•  The labor force participation rate; the often proposed hypothesis is that a higher labor 
force participation will increase sickness absenteeism. 
•  The gender composition of the labor force (e.g., the percentage of the labor force that is 
female). For the time being, we disregard this aspect; later on in the paper, we will use a 
shorter time series with better data, and then we can address the issue in a more efficient 
way.   11
The variable  t REF  is a vector of dummy variables, describing the various reforms that have 
affected the sickness insurance system during the period 1955–99. From Table 1 we can see 
that Sweden has had at least 13 different sickness insurance systems9 since 1955; to these 
should be added changes in other parameters than the compensation level. These changes 
could be represented by a set of dummy variables. For example, let REF63t represent the 1963 
reform, taking the value 0 for all years before 1963 and the value 1 for all  1963 ≥ t . However, 
some reforms were not implemented at the beginning of the year; for a reform implemented 
during a year, the dummy variable becomes a fraction for that year. Thus, since the 1987 
reform was implemented on December 1 of 1987, REF87t = 0 for all t < 1987, REF87t = 1/12 
for t = 1987, and REF87t = 1 for t > 1987. 
 
The dummy variable methodology warrants some comments. Each reform, as described in 
Table 1, changes the individual’s cost of being absent from work. Ideally, economists would 
like to estimate the sensitivity of individuals to changes in that cost, i.e., the price elasticity of 
absenteeism. This is in principle what the cross-section studies, referred to above, do; due to 
the existence of ceilings in the sick leave compensation, differences in tax situation, et cetera, 
there is considerable variation in the cost of absenteeism across individuals. Under one 
particular insurance system, for example the one prevailing in 1992, the cost sensitivity can 
thus be estimated. If one wants to use long time series, with many systems represented, 
individual cost data are difficult (or impossible) to obtain. And since individuals differ in 
many dimensions – for instance, with respect to income, or with respect to the length of the 
sickness spell – there is no one-dimensional measure of the change in the cost of being absent 
from work due to a particular reform. 
 
Also, the matter of information is important. Some reforms seem to have been well known to 
the general public, and thus most people may have had a fairly accurate perception of the cost 
of calling sick at some dates. Other reforms, on the other hand, may have passed relatively 
unnoticed – and one might conjecture that the sheer number of reforms in the 1990s made it 
difficult for many people to keep informed of the current rules in a particular year. Thus, the 
perceived cost is not necessarily the same as the official cost shown in Table 1. Finally, many 
reforms may have implied changes in the strictness of administrative routines, as well as other 
measures not easily captured in the plain compensation levels of Table 1. By using dummies 
                                                 
9 In practice, there are changes in the system taking place more or less continuously. Any grouping of these   12
to represent the reforms, rather than trying to compute a measure of the perceived cost to the 
representative agent, we have tried to handle these complications in a simple and 
straightforward way. 
 
Given that we have settled for the dummy variable methodology, we could in principle run a 
regression including all 13 systems shown in Table 1. This would mean using 12 reform 
dummies. However, given the limited number of observations, the numerous reforms and the 
fact that some of them were in place during a very brief period, including all reforms is bound 
to render the estimates imprecise.10 This is particularly true for the 1990s, when the reforms 
are so frequent that it is difficult to distinguish one from the other. Thus, it is necessary to 
exclude at least some of the reforms during the period in order to make the estimation 
feasible. 
 
We have thus chosen to include all reforms that occurred before the 1990s, i.e., the 1963, 
1967, 1974, and 1987 reforms. As for the 1990s, almost any subset of reforms seem to be 
possible; a priori reasoning has however lead us to include the 1991 and 1998 reforms. The 
1991 reform is the first reduction in compensation levels since the inception of the system in 
1955. This is likely to be of major importance, since it constitutes a fundamental break with 
previous reforms. It is arguably the most hotly debated and criticized reform in the entire 
history of the Swedish sickness insurance system. The 1998 reform is also potentially 
important since it constitutes a new break; it entails the first increase in benefits since 1987.11 
 
In addition to the reforms in Table 1, we have included an allegedly important reform 
implemented in 1995. There was no change in the compensation level then, but according to 
people working in the field, the routines in the whole social insurance system became more 
restrictive, and this (among other things) affected the propensity to call sick. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
changes into “minor” and “major” changes must necessarily be somewhat subjective. 
10 Lidwall and Skogman Thoursie (2000), report a regression on the same data (although not corrected for the 
under-reporting in 1992–1999) including almost all reform dummies. Their results are difficult to compare to 
ours, since their regression equation is static and does not have any explicitly dynamic structure, like our 
equation (1). They also include one additional reform (in 1985), which we choose not to include in Table 1, since 
it only affected a small subset of public-sector employees. In their regression most of the coefficients for the 
reform dummies turn out to be insignificant. 
11 There were two reforms in 1998. Since there were only 3 months between them, they cannot be meaningfully 
distinguished in the data. We have therefore, somewhat arbitrarily, included only the first one in the regressions.   13
There was also a potentially important reform in 1992, when the employers assumed the 
financial responsibility for the first two weeks of a sickness spell. Since there were only 9 
months between the 1991 and 1992 reforms, it is difficult to distinguish their respective 
effects in the data. This is a general problem in the 1990s, when the reforms were so frequent 
that their effects cannot be accurately distinguished. Subsequent reductions in benefit levels 
are likely to be less important than the 1991 and 1992 reforms, since they are both smaller, 
more frequent, and mainly confirm the break in the previous trend towards more generous 
benefit levels. 
 
We have thus settled for the following set of reform dummies: REF63, REF67, REF74, 
REF87, REF91, REF95, and REF98. In order to assess the robustness of this selection, we 
have also run regressions on this set supplemented by various combinations of one or two of 
the other omitted reform dummies (see Appendix). 
 
Finally, estimating an equation like (1) raises the issue of causality. How does one, for 
example, know that the reform variable REF causes sick leave S, and not the other way 
around? For a causal interpretation of a regression coefficient, we must be able to tell a story 
that is reasonable, and the story behind the causation  S REF →  sounds reasonable enough: 
generous compensation rules reduce the cost of being away from work, which makes people 
more likely to call sick. But there is also a story for the reverse causation,  REF S → : more 
people being sick means a higher pressure on the political system to make the benefit rules 
more generous, which in turn makes the politicians more likely to implement generous 
reforms. Which one of these stories is the correct one (in principle, both can be true) is an 
empirical question. But, there are indications that  S REF →  is more plausible. For instance, 
if  REF S → were true, one would first observe an increase in the number of sick days, and 
then a reform would be implemented. But because of lags in the political decision process, it 
would be rather difficult for the incumbent government to implement a reform without any 
delay. Further, if  REF S → had a large explanatory power as compared to the alternative 
causality, the coefficients of our dummy variables would be insignificant. Since this is not the 
case (cf. section IV.B and IV.C), we consider the causation  S REF →  more likely. 
 
   14
B.  Estimation Results for the Long Time Series 
 
The econometric strategy used is to begin by formulating a general and statistically well 
specified model. This is done by estimating equation (1) and applying a set of diagnostic tests. 
Next, the overparameterized model is reduced in order to obtain a parsimonious 
representation, which is tested in order to make sure that the assumptions regarding its 
stochastic properties are fulfilled. To illustrate the degree of relevance of the various reforms, 
the dummies are kept in the final version even when they are insignificant.12 
 
Before carrying out the regression analysis it is useful to consider the stochastic properties of 
the variables. In equation (1), St enters in levels. The reason is that the number of sick days 
during a year is restricted to lie between 0 and 365. Thus, by definition the  t S  time series 
cannot have a unit root. But it is possible that  t S  displays local nonstationarity in our finite 
sample. In fact, testing  t S  for a unit root shows that it is stationary for the period 1970–1999, 
i.e., for most of the sample period but not for the whole period 1955–1999. However, by 
including the reform dummies of 1963 and 1967 nonstationarity was clearly rejected.13 We 
thus proceed under the assumption that St is stationary.14 
 
As for the variables in the X vector, the rate of unemployment (UNEMP) appears to be a 
stationary variable with a structural break in the beginning of the 1990s. This was confirmed 
by a unit root test that included the 1991 reform dummy. 
 
Unfortunately, the mortality rate does not make as much sense as a proxy for general health as 
one would like. It would have been preferable to have a more direct measure of the general 
health status of the labor force, but unfortunately we have not managed to find any reasonable 
measure spanning our long time period. The mortality rate displays an upward trend, despite 
the fact that there is no obvious long-term deterioration in the general health condition of the 
                                                 
12  Ericsson, Campos and Tran (1990) give a good description of the general-to-specific methodology. 
13 Ideally a procedure such as the one developed by Bai and Perron (1998) for testing for multiple structural 
changes should have been used. However, considering our small sample and the fact that the results were as 
expected, using augmented Dickey-Fuller tests seemed sufficient. The results of the unit root tests can be 
obtained from the authors upon request. 
14 We also experimented by estimating the model including a deterministic time trend, but it turned out to be 
insignificant.   15
population during that period. After some hesitation, we have chosen not to include that 
variable.15 
 
Finally, neither the age composition of the labor force nor the labor force participation rate is 
stationary, and they do not appear to be cointegrated. Indeed, the age composition of the labor 
force does not even appear to be first-difference stationary. There is thus no reason to think 
that any of these two variables in levels, or linear combinations of them, should affect sick 
leave. In fact, they did not turn out to have any explanatory power in either levels or first 
differences. We have, therefore, chosen to run the regressions without the age composition of 
the labor force and without the labor force participation rate to get more power when doing 
the general-to-specific modeling and testing for misspecification et cetera. As a final check on 
our results, we tested whether the age composition of the labor force or the labor force 
participation rate entered the parsimonious models, but they turned out to be insignificant.16  
 
The general model for the aggregate data was estimated for the period 1958–1999. It 
contained three lags of each variable, dummies for seven reforms and a constant. None of the 
diagnostic tests was significant, indicating that the model is statistically well specified (not 
reported). After removing insignificant variables we ended up with the parsimonious model. 
Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients and diagnostic test statistics. Statistically the 
estimated model appears well specified; there is no evidence of serial correlation (AR test), 
autoregressive heteroskedasticity (ARCH test), non-normal errors (Normality test) and 
regression mis-specification (RESET test).17 Moreover, the F-test for the reduction of the 
general to the parsimonious model is insignificant. The estimates reported in Table 2 turn out 
to be quite robust with respect to the inclusion of additional reforms during the 1990s – see 
Appendix. 
 
Let us look at the first column, denoted (a). First, we note that current-period unemployment 
is significant,18 with a negative sign, at the 5 percent level; as unemployment increases, 
                                                 
15 Given that the general health condition of the population is not correlated with the reforms, this omission does 
not give rise to any omitted variables bias. We see no a priori reason to expect any correlation of this kind. 
16 An anonymous referee suggested that we should include additional macroeconomic controls. Given the long 
time period the number of reasonable controls available is limited. However, we managed to collect the variable 
number of annual hours worked per person employed. When this variable was added to regressions (a) and (b) in 
Table 2, it turned out to be insignificant.  
17 See Hendry (1995) on these tests. 
18 Lagged values of unemployment were not significant.   16
sickness absenteeism falls. This is a well-known observation, and it could have two 
explanations. One is a selection effect; in a recession, those who are most often sick are the 
first to be laid off.19 The other explanation is based on unemployment as a worker discipline 
device (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). If marginal workers are more likely to have temporary 
contracts, procyclical absenteeism may be even stronger (Arai and Skogman Thoursie, 2001). 
With reliable cross-country data, those two hypotheses could in principle be tested against 
each other. In countries where job protection is strong, the employers have less freedom to 
choose which workers to be laid off. Thus one would expect that the negative effect of 
unemployment on the number of sick days is weaker in such countries than in countries with 
less job protection.20 
 
Looking at the reform coefficients, we see that all but one are significant and have the sign 
that economic theory would predict. When benefits become more generous (like in 1963, 
1967, 1974, 1987 and 1998) the number of sick days increase, and when the insurance system 
becomes more austere (in 1991 and 1995) the number of sick days fall. However, the 1991 
reform should be the cause of some concern, since it is insignificant. We will return to that 
problem in a moment. 
 
The coefficient of the  2 − t S  term was insignificant and has been deleted in the final estimation, 
but the coefficients of the  1 − t S  and  3 − t S  terms were highly significant. The dynamic structure 
of the model makes it possible for us to distinguish between short-run and long-run effects of 
the reforms. Take the 1998 reform as an example. The estimated coefficient is 2.43, which is 
the short-run effect. Since the coefficients of the  1 − t S  and  3 − t S  terms are 0.80 and –0.39, 
respectively, we can easily compute the long-term effect of the 1998 reform as 2.43/(1 – (0.80 
– 0.39)) = 4.12. Thus, while the reform is associated with an immediate increase in the 
number of sick days by 2.43, the number eventually increases to 4.12 days. 
 
Let us now return to the insignificant coefficient of the 1991 reduction in the sickness 
benefits. From the heated debate in the media when the reform was implemented, one would 
expect it to have a clear impact on sick leave behavior. Why the regression coefficient seems 
to tell another story probably lies in the dramatic events in the early 1990s, when the Swedish 
                                                 
19 However, they still can, and have the incentive to, report sick. 
20 Sweden is among the countries which has had the strongest job protection mandates in the OECD area, see 
OECD (1994) and Davis and Henrekson (1999).   17
economy was thrown into its deepest recession since the 1930s. Unemployment started to 
increase dramatically in 1991 and remained high for the rest of the decade. The UNEMP 
variable is thus highly correlated with the REF91 variable, and it is difficult to say how much 
one affects the number of sick days as opposed to the other. In fact, the 1991 reform was 
initiated by the Swedish government’s sharply increasing budget deficits, which called for 
drastic reductions in government spending. Thus the changes in REF91 and UNEMP were 
both endogenous responses to a structural crisis hitting the Swedish economy, and one could 
say that the model represented by equation (1) is the reduced form of another, more general, 
model. The statistically correct approach would be to estimate the structural form of that 
model, but since economic and political theory has not yet told us what such a model would 
look like, this is an infeasible task. 
 
In the absence of such a model, it is instructive to see what happens if we drop the UNEMP 
variable from the regression. The results of such a regression are reported in the second 
column, labeled (b), of Table 2. Here we see that the coefficient of REF91 now turns out to be 
significant, with at t-value of –1.96. 
 
Finally, we note that the dynamic aspects become more pronounced when we drop the 
unemployment term. According to the parameter estimates in column (b) of Table 2, the 
short-run effect of the 1991 reform was to reduce the number of sick days by 1.31 days. The 
long-run effect, however, was to reduce the number by 1.31/(1 – (0.91 – 0.42)) = 2.57 days. 
Similarly, the short run effect of the more generous compensation level introduced in 1998 
was to increase the number of sick days by 3.00 days, while the long-run effect was an 
increase by 3.00/(1 – (0.91 – 0.42)) = 5.88 days. This indicates that the sickness insurance 
system could be a major determinant of the effective labor supply. 
 
A word of caution is warranted in this context. As is seen in Figure 2, the number of sick days 
increased sharply in 1999. The reasons for this are debated; some people point at an alleged 
increase in the level of stress at the workplace. In our model formulation, however, there is no 
room for such explanations. In principle, one could add another explanatory variable to the 
model, but it is desirable that such a variable be observable; to simply include an ad hoc year 
dummy for 1999 is not satisfactory. While waiting for an alternative theory to explain the 
increase in the number of sick days in 1999, that increase might manifest itself in a high value 
of the estimated coefficient of the 1998 reform.   18
 
Table 2   
Effects of the reforms on the number of paid sick days per year using annual data, 
1958–1999. 
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F-test for simplification of 




Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. t-statistics within 
parentheses. The following tests were implemented, serial correlation (AR test), autoregressive heteroskedasticity 
(ARCH test), non-normal errors (Normality test), residual heteroskedasticity test and regression mis-specification 




C.  Estimation Results for Men and Women 
 
It is now time to look into the pattern of sick leave in more detail. From 1964, the 
unemployment data series distinguishes between men and women; we can thus run separate 
estimations for men and women and thereby obtain sharper estimates. The fact that the time 
series is now shorter is a disadvantage, but on the other hand the years that have been deleted 
are those where the number of sick days were somewhat inaccurately measured anyway. We 
estimate the same autoregressive model as before, but with separate estimates for men and 
women. The results are reported in Table 3.21 In line with the discussion above we have 
chosen to delete the age variable from the regression altogether. 
 
First we note that if unemployment is included among the explanatory variables (columns (a) 
in the table), the intercept for men and women do not differ significantly from one another. 
This is contrary to the common view, namely that women are more often sick than men. This 
observed discrepancy can thus be explained by the unemployment and reform variables. Note 
also that if we drop the UNEMP variable (columns (b) in the table) the conventional wisdom 
is restored: The intercept is larger for women than for men, since sick leave of women is more 













                                                 
21 Here, too, we tried to include the labor force participation rate among the explanatory variables, but that 
variable did not come out with a significant coefficient.   20
Table 3 
Effects of the reforms on the number of sick days, 1967–1999.  
 
Variable Men  Women 









































































2 R   0.94 0.94 0.97 0.95


















































Note: ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. t-statistics within parentheses. 
#The degrees of freedom vary across models. See Table 2 for definitions of the diagnostic tests. 
 
 
Third, we see that all reform variables except REF98 have insignificant coefficients in the 
regression for men – and this holds regardless of whether we include UNEMP or not. For 
women, on the other hand, most reform variables have significant coefficients of the expected   21
sign. This holds both if we include and exclude the UNEMP variable. Thus, women seem to 
be more sensitive to economic incentives than men. This result conforms to the standard result 
in the labor supply literature. For example, Aronsson and Walker (1997, tables 5.2 and 5.3) 
review a number of empirical studies showing that female labor supply is more sensitive than 
male labor supply to the after-tax wage rate.22 It is however in stark contrast to the results 
regarding female sick leave behavior by Johansson and Brännäs (1998), and by Broström, 
Johansson and Palme (2001). These authors have estimated quite different models of sick 
leave, based on cross-section individual Swedish data for a few years only, and they report 
that women are less sensitive than men to changes in the cost (i.e., the compensation level) of 
being absent from work.23 
 
 
Further, we see that contemporaneous as well as lagged unemployment is insignificant in the 
estimation for men, while first and second lags of unemployment are significant for women. 
Note also that although the first lag coefficient is negative, as expected, the second lag 
coefficient is positive.  
 
A fourth observation is that the discrepancy between the short-run and the long-run effects 
seem to be stronger in Table 3 than in Table 2. Whether this is due to the long-run effects 
having increased over time, or whether using separate estimates for men and women, is 
difficult to tell. In any event, while the short-run effect of the 1998 reform was to increase the 
number of sick days for men by 1.78 days (1.92 if we drop the UNEMP variable) the long-run 
effect is 1.78/(1 – 1.03 + 0.40) = 4.81 days (5.65 days if we drop the UNEMP variable). For 
women, the short-run effect of 2.78 days (3.39 without UNEMP) corresponds to a long-run 
effect of 2.78/(1 – 0.89 + 0.32) = 6.46 days (6.16 without UNEMP). Here, too, the 
qualification that we do not yet know whether the sharp increase in absenteeism in 1999 really 
was the consequence of the 1998 reform, or whether there was another cause, still applies.  
 
 
V.  A Panel Data Analysis of the Effects of the 1987 and 1991 Reforms 
 
In the previous section we saw that even using annual time-series data one could, in most 
cases, detect large and significant effects on sick leave of changes in the benefit system. 
                                                 
22 See also the survey by Killingsworth and Heckman (1986).   22
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, we cannot find consistently negative effects of the 1991 
reduction in sickness benefits. As already noted, one reason for this could be that the 1991 
reform coincided with the onset of a deep economic crisis, and that the reform was instituted 
in response to the economic crisis. Moreover, given that we only have annual data and that the 
1990s are characterized by numerous changes of the system, there is also likely to be a lack of 
degrees of freedom.  
 
Fortunately, there are data available for the period 1983–91 that permit us to obtain sharper 
estimates of the effects of the 1987 and 1991 reforms. During this period the National 
Insurance Board (RFV) collected quarterly data covering all paid sick leave in Sweden.24 
These sick leave data are also available on a regional basis (27 regions), which increases the 
number of degrees of freedom tremendously. However, no such high quality disaggregated 
data is available after 1991, since the public system gives no coverage for the first two weeks 
from 1992 (four weeks in 1997–98) and the employers have no incentives to report sick leave 
accurately to the National Insurance Board. Nevertheless, the data at hand are sufficient to 
assess the effects of the 1987 and 1991 reforms in greater detail. 
 
As dependent variables we use the number of sick days per quarter (DAYS) and the number of 
sick leave spells per quarter (SPELLS). Among the regressors we include regional and 
seasonal dummies. We do not have separate data on sick leave for males and females. Instead 
we control for a likely gender effect by including the share of women in the labor force in 
each region (FEMALE) among the regressors. UNEMP measures the rate of unemployment in 
each region. Other control variables are the labor force participation rate (PART) and the share 
of the employed that work more than 35 hours per week (INTENSITY), which is used as a 
measure of work intensity. 
 
The two reforms took place at the beginning of December and March, respectively; hence the 
reform dummies will take the value 1/3 in the reform quarter and unity thereafter. Both 
reforms, and in particular the 1991 reform, were preceded by a great deal of publicity and 
public debate, and as a result the immediate effect may differ from the long-run effect.25 
                                                                                                                                                         
23 In another empirical study of sick leave in Sweden, using cross-section data , Johansson and Palme (2000), do 
not find any clear differences between men and women with respect to the sensitivity to the cost of sick leave. 
24 During the period 1983–88 monthly data was collected, but in order to cover the whole period through 1991 
quarterly data has to be used.  
25 See Lidwall and Örnhall (1991) for a more thorough discussion.   23
Hence, we use a specification that allows for a different effect during the actual reform 
quarter in 1987 and 1991 as compared to the long-run effect. This is achieved by including 
reform quarter dummies (REFQ87 and REFQ91), which take the value 1 in Q4 of 1987 and 
Q1 of 1991, respectively, and 0 in all other quarters. 
 
Our data set consists of observations from 27 regions for 36 quarters, hence a (possibly 
dynamic) panel estimation is called for. We begin by estimating the effect on DAYS. A least-
squares regression with a White heteroskedasticity consistent variance-covariance matrix is 
reported in column (a) of Table 4. Here we obtain very strong and significant effects of the 
two reforms. It is also clear that the reform quarter dummies need to be included. However, it 
is evident from the DW-statistic that the residuals are autocorrelated. The simplest way to 
correct for this problem is to model the residual as an AR1-process. The results from this 
estimation are reported in column (b).26 The two reforms still come through as having a 
significant effect and the estimated effect is quantitatively important. The 1987 reform is 
estimated to have increased the number of annual sick days by roughly 1.1 (0.27 x 4) days per 
year. Compared to an average of 23 days of sick leave per insured in 1987, this implies an 
increase of roughly five percent as a result of the reform. The 1991 reform is estimated to 
have reduced the annual number of sick days by 0.8 (0.19 x 4) days, which corresponds to a 
reduction of 3.3 percent relative to the 1990 level. 
 
An alternative, and more general, way to account for the dynamic structure is to estimate a 
dynamic panel (see Baltagi, 1995). It turns out that all the dynamics we need, to obtain well-
behaved residuals, is to include a one-period lag of the dependent variable among the 
regressors. When one has to model an episode that has an impact on the dependent variable 
for one period only, a lag of this impact dummy has to be included when a lag of the 
dependent variable is included among the regressors. Why this is so is shown in the Appendix.  
 
In column (c) we report such a dynamic regression while only correcting for 
heteroskedasticity using White’s (1980) method. However, the variance-covariance matrix 
indicates that residuals are highly correlated across regions, which means that a GLS with 
estimated cross-section residual covariance matrix can increase the efficiency of the 
estimation. This regression is reported in column (d).   24
 
According to the dynamic panel estimation, the 1987 reform has the expected positive effect 
on the number of sick days, although it should be noted that the quantitative effect is found to 
be rather small. The 1991 reform has a significantly negative effect on sick leave. The first 
quarter effect is very strong, indicating an immediate drop of roughly four days per year or 20 
percent relative to the 1990 level. The permanent effect of the 1991 reform is found to be 
smaller, being in the order of one day per year. Thus, the coefficient of REFQ91 indicates a 
fair amount of overshooting, but the coefficient of REFQ91t–1 indicates that this initial effect 
is reverted after one period. A plausible explanations for this pattern may be that the reduced 
compensation level in 1991 was highly publicized and hotly debated in the media at the time, 
but that the effect of this debate on actual behavior faded rather quickly. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
26 In a more flexible specification we also allowed for different seasonal effects for each region and different 
AR1-processes across regions (available upon request). The results are very similar, which can be seen as an 
indication that the AR1-result is very robust.   25
Table 4 
Effects of the 1987 and 1991 reforms on the number of paid sick days per quarter  
using regional and quarterly data for the 1983–91 period.  
 
Variable (a) (b) (c) (d) 
















































































2  0.83 0.90 0.90 0.91 
DW  0.88 2.16 2.07 2.11 
No. of obs.  972 945 945 945 
 
Note: ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively.  t-statistics within parentheses. 
Estimates of the regional and quarterly dummies are not reported. In the GLS estimations we allow for different 
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Table 5 
Effects of the 1987 and 1991 reforms on the number of sickness spells per quarter using 
regional and quarterly data for the 1983-91 period. 
 
































2  0.81 0.80 
DW  1.99 1.97 
No. of obs.  972 972 
 
Note: Estimates of the regional and quarterly dummies are not reported. In the SUR-estimation (b) we allow for 
different seasonal effects and correlated residuals across regions. In both regressions we correct for 
heteroskedasticity using White’s (1980) method. 
 
The quarterly data set has the further advantage that we can explore the effect of changes in 
the benefit level on one other aspect of sick leave, namely, the number of sick leave spells per 
time period. A change in the number of sick leave days results from the combined effect of 
changes in the average number of sick leave days per spell of sickness and the average 
number of sick leave spells per person. The 1991 reform disproportionately increased the cost 
of sick leave during the first three days, while the reduction was much smaller after the third 
day. Hence, if economic incentives are important, we would a priori expect a stronger effect 
on SPELLS than on DAYS. In Table 5 we report two regressions with SPELLS as the 
dependent variable. First, we may note that there is no autocorrelation in the residuals, so no 
lagged dependent variable is needed. In column (a) we report a heteroskedasticity-consistent 
least squares estimation, while column (b) reports a panel estimation using the SUR method. 
Using the latter (preferred) method the reform quarter dummies can be excluded without 
causing any econometric problems. Looking at regression (b), we can note that we find the   27
expected positive effect on the number of spells after the 1987 reform, but even more 
importantly, we find a highly significant and quantitatively very large drop in the number of 
spells of sickness following the 1991 reform. An estimated drop in SPELLS of 0.52 (4 x 0.13) 
per year amounts to a drop of 23 percent relative to the 1990 level of an average 2.3 spells per 
year per insured.27 
 
Thus, short-term sick leave decreased far more than long-term sick leave. This reinforces the 
conclusion that the benefit level is an important determinant of sick leave behavior: the 1991 
reform reduced compensation the most for sick leave of short duration, and should there be an 




VI.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have examined whether the level of sick leave compensation affects sick 
leave behavior. In contrast to earlier studies we have used aggregate data on average sick 
leave absence. The study has covered Sweden from 1955 to 1999. During this period the 
compensation level was changed on numerous occasions both upward and downward, which 
provides us with a number of natural experiments for empirical testing. According to our 
regression analyses there appears, in most cases, to be strong effects on sick leave behavior 
from changes in sick leave compensation levels. When the insurance system is made more 
generous, the aggregate number of sick days increases, and when the system is made more 
austere, the number falls. We also find clear differences across gender; in general, the sick 
leave behavior of women is found to be more sensitive to economic incentives than that of 
men. 
 
The strong effects of changes in the compensation level are also apparent in our 
complementary panel study using quarterly data for the period 1983–91. The estimated effect 
of both the 1987 and 1991 reforms have the expected sign and are highly significant. Here it 
is particularly noteworthy that the number of sickness spells fell dramatically following the 
1991 reform, when the reduction of compensation for the first few days of sick leave was 
particularly large. 
                                                 
27 A similar result is reported by Johansson and Palme (1996) who find a sharp drop in the number of short-term 
sickness spells between 1990 and 1991, while the number of spells exceeding three months actually increase.   28
 
The interpretation of the significant unemployment effect raises a number of interesting 
issues. A simple interpretation is that it provides indirect evidence of the Shapiro and Stiglitz 
(1984) proposition that unemployment could function as a “worker discipline device”. A 
different interpretation is that major changes in the rules of the sickness insurance system tend 
to coincide in time with marked business-cycle phenomena. A clear-cut example is the deep 
Swedish recession that started in 1991, which caused unemployment to rise sharply and 
public-sector finances to deteriorate, thereby forcing the government to cut down on various 
welfare schemes including the sickness insurance. Endogenizing policy shifts, and trying to 
decompose the unemployment effect into these two mechanisms, seems like an interesting 
issue, although such a task is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
 
The partial nature of our analysis should be pointed out. Our empirical results show clearly 
that a reduction in the sickness benefits is associated with fewer sick days. This may however 
be counteracted by other behavioral responses, for example an increased tendency to early 
retirement. Such a response could be particularly relevant in higher age groups, and an in-
depth study of the interaction between different welfare systems stands out as a promising 
avenue for future research.  
   29
Appendix A 
Data description, variable definitions and statistical sources 
 
Variable Definition  Source 
Dependent variables    
DAYS  Average number of days of sickness per 
time period per insured† 
National Insurance Board, SAF 
(2000) 
SPELLS  Average number of spells of sickness 
per time period per insured 
National Insurance Board 
    
Explanatory variables    
MORT  Number of deaths per 100,000 in the 
total population 
Statistics Sweden 
AGE  Share of the labor force aged 45–64 (%)  Statistics Sweden 
UNEMP  Open unemployment as a share of the 
labor force (%) 
Statistics Sweden 
LFP  Share of women or men aged 16–64 in 
the labor force (%) 
Statistics Sweden 
FEMALE  Share of women in the labor force at the 
regional level (%) 
Statistics Sweden 
PART  Labor force participation rate (%)  Statistics Sweden 
INTENSITY  Share of employed working > 35 hours 
per week 
Statistics Sweden 
Reform dummies  See text   
Note: Depending on the context the variable is either annual or quarterly, and in the latter case it applies to the 
regional level. 
†After 1991 the National Insurance Board has no information about the number of sick days during the first two 
weeks of a sickness spell (four weeks during the period 1997.01–1998.03). In order to correct for this we have 
constructed a new annual data series using data from SAF (2000) on sick leave as a percentage of contracted 
working hours during the period when the compensation is paid by the employer. The SAF data only covers the 
private sector and in order to get a figure for the whole economy we assume that behavior is identical in the 
private and public sectors. The SAF data contains detailed information on the percentage of the contracted 
number of workdays lost due to sick leave. In particular, it contains information on the fraction of sick leave 
attributable to the first two (or four) weeks of a sickness spell. This fraction can be translated into a number of 
working days lost, which in turn is added to the number of days in the RFV database. In order to translate the 
percentage measure into the number of working days, we assume that the annual number of working days is 223 




The robustness of the estimates 
 
In the 1990s, the reforms are very frequent, and thus there is strong multicollinearity among 
the corresponding dummy variables. Including all reforms in the regression is therefore not 
meaningful; in the regressions reported in Table 2, we have not included the following 
reforms: REF92, REF93(2), REF96, REF97, and REF98(2). Some of these could, however, 
be included in order to illustrate the robustness of the estimates reported in Table 2. 
 
We delete the reforms that are closer than one year to the reforms included in Table 2, i.e., we 
delete REF92 and REF98(2). Further, when choosing between REF93(1) and REF93(2), we 
choose to drop the latter. Of the remaining reforms dummies, we form all conceivable 
combinations of one or two additional reform dummies, i.e., we form the six sets (REF93),   30
(REF96), (REF97), (REF93 + REF96), (REF93 + REF97) and (REF96 + REF97). 
Supplementing the equation reported in Table 2 with each one of these six sets of additional 
explanatory variables yields six new regression results. None of the variables REF93, REF96 
and REF97 obtain significant coefficients, in any combination. Including them, however, 
affects the coefficients of other variables. The effects of these inclusions are summarized in 
the table below, where the figures within square brackets represent the ranges of the estimate 
coefficients, and the asterisks represent the significance levels of the new estimates of the 
variables in Table 2. As before, column (a) reports the estimates including the UNEMP 
variable, while column (b) represents the estimates without it. 
 
Variable (a) (b) 
Constant  [7.86, 8.24] ∗∗∗ [6.30, 7.08] ∗∗∗ 
UNEMP  [–0.42, –0.31] 0, ∗∗ – 
REF63  [1.17, 1.19] ∗, ∗∗ [1.11, 1.17] ∗∗ 
REF67  [2.57, 2.70] ∗∗∗ [2.03, 2.29] ∗∗∗ 
REF74  [1.35, 1.42] ∗∗∗ [1.17, 1.39] ∗∗∗ 
REF87  [0.90, 1.00] ∗∗∗ [0.94, 1.09] ∗, ∗∗ 
REF91  [–0.05, 0.07]  [–1.27, –0.83] 0, ∗ 
REF95  [–4.47, –1.72] 0, ∗∗ [–4.44, –1.65] 0, ∗ 
REF98  [1.94, 2.43] ∗, ∗∗ [2.48, 2.96] ∗∗∗ 
1 − t S   [0.79, 0.81] ∗∗∗ [0.87, 0.91] ∗∗∗ 
3 − t S   [–0.40, –0.38] ∗∗∗ [–0.43, –0.42] ∗∗∗ 
 
The table should be read as follows. For instance, for REF74, in column (b), the coefficient 
estimates ranged between a minimum of 1.17 (when we included REF97 in addition to the 
reforms included in Table 2) and a maximum of 1.39 (when we included REF93 and REF96). 
The three stars indicate that all estimates of the REF74 coefficient were significant at the 1% 
level. For REF91, the estimates are less robust; they range between –1.27 (when we include 
REF93) and –0.83. The “0, ∗∗” indicate that the significant level ranges from zero (for the 
combinations (REF93), (REF93 + REF96), and (REF93 + REF97)) to 10% (for the 
combinations (REF96), (REF97), and (REF96 + REF97)). 
 
The conclusion is that most of the coefficients reported in Table 2 are very robust to 
additional explanatory variables. All reform dummies prior to the 1990s are virtually 
unaffected by whatever combination of additional explanatory variables we include. Also, the 
REF98 coefficient turns out to be robust, while there is some ambiguity regarding REF91 and 
REF95. Additional estimations substituting REF92 for REF91, and REF96 for REF95, 





Modeling an impact dummy when the lagged dependent variable is among the regressors 
 
To remove a single outlier a dummy that takes the value one in that period and zero otherwise 
is sufficient if there are no lags of the dependent variable among the regressors. Otherwise, as   31
a general rule, as many lags of the impact dummy as lags of the dependent variable need to be 
included. Suppose that we do not insert the lag of the dummy as in: 
 
t t t t t t D x x y y ε β β β β α + + + + + = − − 4 1 3 2 1 1  (A1) 
 
where εt is iid and Dt takes the value 1 only at t = T. In (A1), which includes no lag of the 
dummy, the impact effect of the outlier is β4 in period T, β1β4 in period T + 1,  4
2
1 β β in period 
T + 2, and so forth. Therefore, this model is not appropriate if we want to capture the effect of 
an episode that only has a one-period impact. The appropriate model in this case is: 
 
t t t t t t t D D x x y y ε β β β β β α + + + + + + = − − − 1 5 4 1 3 2 1 1  (A2) 
 
Model (A2) is flexible enough to allow for the episode to have an impact in one period only. 
Moreover, it nests (A1), so the estimation of (A2) is fully in line with the general-to-specific 
methodology (Hendry, 1995). Incidentally, (A2) is the unrestricted version of the following 
model: 
 
t t t t u D b x b a y + + + = 2 1  (A3) 
 
where ut is AR(1). Thus (A2) nests both (A1) and (A3). (A3) is the model used in column (b) 
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